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Abstract
This article explores how Australian jurisdictions came to have an approach to the age of  criminal
responsibility similar to that which existed in England and Wales until 1998. It discusses recent debates in
Australia about reforming the minimum age of  criminal responsibility and the presumption of  doli
incapax. This shows that while there has been criticism of  the presumption of  doli incapax within
Australia no jurisdiction has taken the English step of  abolishing it. It finds that a greater challenge to the
presumption of  doli incapax may, however, come from calls for an increase in the minimum age of  criminal
responsibility to the age of  12. While several common law countries have raised the minimum age level to
12 (as called for by the UN Committee on the Rights of  the Child), they have also abolished the
presumption of  doli incapax, thus reducing protection for 12- and 13-year-olds. This article argues that
unless the minimum age of  criminal responsibility is raised to 14 or 16, as preferred by the UN Committee,
there are good reasons to retain the presumption of  doli incapax.
Introduction
It is well known that age levels and methods for assessing the criminal responsibility ofchildren1 vary significantly across the world. However, the effects of  colonisation mean
that it is possible to identify patterns across jurisdictions. Generally speaking, countries
affected by the English common law, such as Australia, India, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Singapore and South Africa, have tended to have low age levels of  criminal responsibility
compared to those influenced by the civil law tradition.2 However, comparing age levels of
criminal responsibility can be difficult. This is because there may be differences in
approaches to the age of  criminal responsibility with some jurisdictions having a single
minimum age of  criminal responsibility under which a child can never be prosecuted,3 while
some set such a minimum age level generally, but allow prosecution below this age for
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1     The term child and children will be generally used throughout this article to refer to any young person under
the age of  18. 
2     See Donald Cipriani, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of  Criminal Responsibility: A Global Perspective (Ashgate
2009) 71–76.
3     For instance, England and Wales, Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 50 (as amended by Children and
Young Persons Act 1963, s 16(1)).
specific offences.4 Other jurisdictions have a minimum age of  criminal responsibility and
also a higher conditional age level where a child’s liability to prosecution depends on an
individual assessment of  his or her criminal capacity (often referred to as the presumption
of  doli incapax in common law jurisdictions).5 Another approach is to not set any minimum
age of  criminal responsibility, but only a conditional age level so that criminal prosecution
always depends on an assessment of  a child’s criminal capacity up until this age.6 This
complexity in approaches to the age of  criminal responsibility is further compounded by
differences in jurisdictional and discipline understandings of  what the age of  criminal
responsibility means and differences in how young people who commit crimes are dealt
with. For instance, some countries may have a low age of  criminal responsibility, but may
not permit the prosecution of  a child under a certain age in any criminal proceedings7 or
may only permit the prosecution of  a child in youth-specific courts. Some jurisdictions
which allow a child to be prosecuted in criminal proceedings may only allow certain non-
punitive measures to be applied to a child under a certain age (which may differ from the
age at which they can be held responsible for criminal conduct).8
In order to place the discussion of  the age of  criminal responsibility in Australia into
context and help clarify what exactly is being discussed, this article will begin by exploring
the meaning and importance of  the age of  criminal responsibility. It will then explain the
background to the current approach to the age of  criminal responsibility in Australia and
how the law came to be similar to that in England and Wales (before the abolition of  the
presumption of  doli incapax in 1998).9 It will then examine recent debates about reform
to the age of  criminal responsibility in Australia. This will show that, despite sharing a
common tradition, the laws relating to the age of  criminal responsibility now differ
significantly from the law in England and Wales and it is unlikely that any Australian
jurisdiction would take a similar approach to England and Wales. Finally, it will be argued
that recent calls for a higher minimum age of  criminal responsibility based on obligations
under the UN Convention on the Rights of  the Child (UNCRC) could end up leaving
children with less protection if  this is combined with an abolition of  the presumption of
doli incapax.
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4     For instance, Ireland, Children Act 2001, s 52(1) and s 52(2) (as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006, s 129).
A further complexity is that in Ireland a child under 14 cannot be prosecuted without the permission of  the
Director of  Public Prosecutions (s 52(4)). 
5     For instance, all Australian jurisdictions, see, for example, Criminal Code of  Western Australia, s 29 ; RP v R
[2015] NSWCCA 215.
6     For instance, France, Penal Code, Article 122–8.
7     For instance, Scotland has a minimum age of  criminal responsibility of  8, but does not allow the prosecution
of  any child under 12 and children between 12 and 16 can only be prosecuted with permission of  the Lord
Advocate, Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 41 and s 41A, as amended by Criminal Justice and
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s 52.
8     For instance, according to the French Penal Code, Article 122–8, while maintaining that any minor able to
understand what they are doing is wrong is criminally responsible for the felonies, misdemeanours or petty
offences for which they have been found guilty, restricts the measures available depending on the age of  the
minor. The educational measures available for 10- to 18-year-olds are specified in the legislation as well as the
penalties that may be imposed on those aged between 13 and 18, taking into account the reduction in
responsibility resulting from their age. 
9     The rebuttable presumption of  doli incapax was abolished by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 34.
What do we mean by the age of criminal responsibility?
The age of  criminal responsibility can be understood in various ways.10 One understanding
relates to the age at which it is thought that children are old enough to be processed within
the criminal justice system in the same way as adults. This can mean the age at which it is
thought that children no longer need to be dealt with in specialised children’s courts with
modified procedures. It may also mean the age at which it is thought that the young can
be punished in the same way as adults, i.e. the age at which it is thought that the young no
longer deserve, or are amenable to, modified, education/welfare-oriented measures.11 This
understanding of  the age of  criminal responsibility is less, if  at all, concerned with the
capacities of  the individual child and more with the appropriateness of  certain procedures
and measures for children in general.
A different understanding of  the age of  criminal responsibility relates to the
fundamental understanding of  the nature of  criminal law and culpability. It is based on
the idea that, unless a person has certain capacities, they should not be liable to conviction
and punishment in criminal proceedings. Hale explained the capacities that underlie the
concept of  criminal responsibility in 1736:
Man is naturally endowed with these two great faculties, understanding and liberty
of  will, and therefore is a subject properly capable of  a law properly so called, and
consequently obnoxious to guilt and punishment for the violation of  that law,
which in respect of  these two great faculties he hath a capacity to obey . . . And
because liberty or choice of  the will presupposeth an act of  the understanding to
know the thing or action chosen by the will, it follows that where there is a total
defect of  the understanding, there is no free act of  the will in the choice of  things
or actions. But general notions or rules are too extravagant and undeterminate . .
. and therefore it hath been always the wisdom of  the states and law-givers to
prescribe limits and bounds to these general notions, and to define what persons
and actions are exempt from the severity of  the general punishments of  penal law
in respect of  their incapacity or defect of  will.12
The examples that Hale gives in his work, Pleas of  the Crown, of  where capacity is thought
to be lacking are infancy (ch III) and ‘madness and lunacy’ (ch IV). Criminal responsibility
is, according to this conceptualisation, based on a cognitive element, the ability to
orientate oneself  on legal norms, to understand what the law requires one to do or not to
do and the ability to understand the nature of  the act committed and its consequences.13
It is also based on a volitional element, the ability to control one’s actions and thus the
ability to behave according to the legal norms recognised.14 In the case of  adults it is
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10   See, for example, Scottish Law Commission, Report on Age of  Criminal Responsibility (Scot Law Com No 185
Stationery Office 2002). See also the webpage of  the British government which, under the heading ‘Age of
criminal responsibility’, notes that the age of  criminal responsibility is 10 and on the same page also details
how children aged 10 up to the age of  18 are treated differently from adults <www.gov.uk/age-of-criminal-
responsibility>.
11   This does not deny the fact that some measures available for young people are punitive.
12   Matthew Hale, The History of  the Pleas of  the Crown vol 1 (1736: reprint Professional Books 1971) 14–15.
13   Although in English law there is a tendency to only focus on the former capacity, the capacity to understand.
For discussion of  this, see Thomas Crofts, The Criminal Responsibility of  Children and Young Persons (Ashgate
2002); Catherine Elliott, ‘Criminal Responsibility and Children: A New Defence Required to Acknowledge the
Absence of  Capacity and Choice’ (2011) 75 Journal of  Criminal Law 289–308.
14   H L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (OUP 1968) 218; Nicola Lacey, ‘In Search of  the Responsible Subject:
History, Philosophy and Criminal Law Theory’ 64 Modern Law Review (2001) 350, 353.
assumed that these abilities are given15 and it can be taken that they are criminally
responsible for what they do. In exceptional situations where this is not the case, such as
where the person suffers from some mental impairment, the law allows a defence. In
contrast, children are in the process of  developing these abilities and lacking these
abilities is not an exception to the norm, rather it is a stage ‘through which we must all of
us have passed before attaining adulthood and maturity’.16 According to this
understanding, the age of  criminal responsibility relates to the age at which it is thought
that a child has the capacities required to be criminally responsible and thus can
appropriately be found guilty of  criminal offences and subjected to sanctions of  the
criminal justice system.
Some consider that getting the age of  criminal responsibility in the former sense right
is more important than fixing the age in the latter sense at an appropriate level. The
Independent Commission on Youth Crime and Antisocial Behaviour in the UK did not,
for example, recommend raising the age level of  criminal responsibility in England and
Wales because it was of  the view that even jurisdictions reliant on criminal justice
proceedings ‘apply welfare-oriented principles and can refer children to protective and
educative measures, including secure care’.17 This sort of  view might also go some way
to explaining why there is a good deal more discussion about the age at which the young
should be dealt with by separate modified proceedings, at what age and under what
circumstances young people should be diverted from formal proceedings and what
measures are appropriate once the young are drawn into the criminal justice system, while
much less attention has been paid to the concept of  criminal responsibility, as it relates to
a child’s capacity to be held responsible.18
Such a view is, however, problematic because it insufficiently acknowledges that the
system that frames these modified procedures and sanctions, and diversionary measures,
is still a criminal justice system regardless of  how tempered it is by welfare considerations.
This means that diversionary measures, such as warnings, cautions and restorative
measures, while providing important alternatives to prosecution,19 do not completely
prevent prosecution. They can still have criminal justice consequences, for instance, they
may only be applied a limited number of  times and may be taken into consideration to
determine whether or not to prosecute a child in subsequent cases. If  conditions that are
attached to diversionary or restorative measures are not complied with, they may trigger
prosecution for the original offence.
Thus, while there is no doubt that it is essential to consider how the criminal justice
system should be modified to best address offending by young people and what measures
might be appropriate to divert young people from prosecution, it must be remembered
that, whatever modifications are made, a criminal justice system functions on the basis of
individual responsibility and choice and aims to ensure that any measures applied are
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15   Packer calls the idea of  free will not a statement of  fact but ‘a value preference having very little to do with
the metaphysics of  determinism and free will’. Herbert Packer, The Limits of  the Criminal Law (Stanford
University Press 1968) 74. 
16   Bridge LJ in R v Camplin [1978] 1 All ER 1236, 1241.
17   Independent Commission on Youth Crime and Antisocial Behaviour, Time for a Fresh Start (2010) 14
<www.police-foundation.org.uk/uploads/catalogerfiles/independent-commission-on-youth-crime-and-
antisocial-behaviour/fresh_start.pdf>.
18   Julia Fionda, ‘Youth and Justice’ in J Fionda (ed), Legal Concepts of  Childhood (Hart 2001) 77–97, 85–86; Gerry
Maher, ‘Age and Criminal Responsibility’ (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of  Criminal Law 493–512.
19   Restorative measures, such as conferencing, can take many forms and be described in various ways, they may
also take place as diversionary measures or as post-conviction measures.
based on the guilty commission of  a criminal act.20 The criminal justice system can pose
a heavy and stigmatising burden on a child and it is well documented that early
involvement in the criminal justice system can have negative impacts on a child and lead
to enmeshment within that system.21 It is therefore vital that attention is paid to the
fundamental question of  the age at which it appropriate to presume that children lack the
capacity to be responsible for their criminal behaviour and hence should be completely
protected from criminal proceedings. The following will trace the background to age of
criminal responsibility in Australia as it relates to the capacity to be held responsible.
The common law position of the age of criminal responsibility
Until changes made in the twentieth century in England and some other common law
countries (which will be discussed in the following section), the common law approach
was to have two age levels of  criminal responsibility; a lower one where the child was
absolutely presumed incapable of  guilt and a higher age period where the presumption of
incapacity (or so called presumption of  doli incapax) was rebuttable. Traditionally, the
lower age level (age of  absolute criminal incapacity or minimum age of  criminal
responsibility) was set at 7 and the higher period of  conditional criminal responsibility
was set at 14. In comparison to jurisdictions influenced by civil law, these age levels seem
relatively low and it is interesting to briefly trace how the common law determined these
age levels.
From the earliest times, allowance has been made for the differential treatment of
children who commit crime or who are involved in crime. As far back as the time of  King
Ine (688–725) the law stated that a boy of  10 could be privy to theft22 and the law of  King
Aethelstan (925–935) held that, if  a child above the age of  12 stole an item valued at over
eight pence, he should not be spared punishment.23 This protection under the law of  King
Aethelstan was not, however, absolute, because if  the child defended himself  or attempted
to flee then he was not to be spared punishment.24 At the Judicia civitatis Lundoniae King
Aethelstan also made it known that he had heard that young men had been killed for
stealing and that he found this cruel. He therefore commanded that no person under 15
years of  age should be slain, provided that the child surrendered him or herself  and did
not make resistance or flee.25 The fact that children could be punished below these age
levels dependent on their behaviour casts doubt on the accuracy of  Blackstone’s statement
that ‘[b]y the ancient Saxon law, the age of  twelve years was established for the age of
possible discretion, when first understanding might open’.26 Rather than being a minimum
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20   For further discussion, see, for example, Michael Freeman, The Rights and Wrongs of  Children (Frances Pinter
1983) 81–86.
21   See, for example, Centre for Social Justice, Rules of  Engagement: Changing the Heart of  Youth Justice (2012)
<www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/UserStorage/pdf/Pdf%20reports/CSJ_Youth_Justice_Full_Report.pdf>.
22   Laws of  King Ine 7.2 reproduced in Wiley B Sanders (ed), Juvenile Offenders for a Thousand Years: Selected Readings
from Anglo-Saxon Times to 1900 (University of  North Carolina Press 1970) 3. This law related to stealing and
provided that if  the wife and children had knowledge that the head of  the household had stolen then they
should all go into slavery. Thus, noting that a boy of  10 could be privy to theft suggests that below this age
he was to be spared such punishment. 
23   Laws of  King Aethelstan (Council of  Greatanlea) reproduced in ibid. See also Benjamin Thorpe (ed), Ancient
Law and Institutes of  England (Lawbook Exchange 1840) 85. 
24   Laws of  King Aethelstan (Council of  Greatanlea) reproduced in Sanders (n 22) 3. 
25   Laws of  King Aethelstan (Judicia civitatis Lundoniae 12, 1) reproduced in ibid 3–4.
26   William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of  England Book 4 (Clarendon Press 1769) ch 2 (emphasis added).
For more discussion see Thomas Crofts, The Criminal Responsibility of  Children and Young Persons (Ashgate, 2002).
age of  criminal responsibility, as we would understand it today, it indicates a view that
children generally deserved protection from punishment unless there was some form of
behaviour that indicated that they deserved treating as an adult below that age level.
These age levels in Anglo-Saxon laws seem, at a first reading, relatively high compared
to the age levels that form the basis of  the modern common law approach. Walker finds
that this might be because the test for whether a child had ‘discretion’ would have been
very practical in those times, such as could the child count to 12.27 He notes that: ‘[I]t is
tempting to generalize and say that the test was whether he had the understanding of  an
adult.’28 He attributes what he sees as a lowering of  the age of  criminal responsibility to
the influence of  Roman Law:
It was not until the law had come firmly under the influence of  the Continental
Church, and thus of  Roman Law, that the age of  seven is mentioned. This as the
age at which both Roman Law and the Church assumed that a child begins to
know good from evil.29
Evidence can be found that does suggest, as noted by Walker, that reference to the age
of  7 is due to the influence of  Roman Law. Roman Law is thought to have begun to
influence common law more clearly through legal writers such as Glanville30 and
Bracton31 in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.32 Several early cases do mention the age
of  7, for instance, in a case from 1313–1314 Spigurnel J stated that a child charged with
homicide ought not to suffer judgment if  he did the deed before he was 7, because he
does not know of  good and evil, but after that age he should be able to have such
knowledge.33 The mentioning of  the age of  7 does not, as suggested by Walker, appear
to have meant a reduction in the age of  criminal responsibility. Rather, it represents the
concretisation of  an age level under which a child could never be subject to punishment,
thus, what we would now call the age of  absolute criminal incapacity or minimum age of
criminal responsibility. Above this age a child was still generally protected from
punishment, as in earlier times, unless there were indicators that he or she had knowledge
of  good and evil. This represents what we might now call the age of  conditional criminal
responsibility, where the presumption of  doli incapax applies.
It seems clear that from ancient times there has always been a conditional age period
where children were generally protected from punishment and, from around the time of
the influence of  Roman Law, common law began to distinguish two age levels. It
continued the higher conditional age period where the child’s liability to conviction and
punishment depended on an assessment of  his or her ability to discern good from evil, but
it also introduced a lower age level at 7 under which there was absolute protection from
prosecution. The age at which the upper conditional age period ended and the child’s
liability to punishment was no longer dependent on an assessment of  whether he or she
understood the difference between good and evil seems to have been unclear for a
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27   Nigel Walker, ‘Childhood and Madness: History and Theory’ in Allison Morris and Henri Giller (eds), Providing
Criminal Justice for Children (Edward Arnold 1983) 19–35, 23.
28   Ibid 23.
29   Ibid. 
30   Ranulf  de Glanvill, Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae (Treatise on the Laws and Customs of
the Kingdom of  England) (c 1180–1190). 
31   Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of  England) c 1235.
32   See Thomas Scrutton, The Influence of  the Roman Law on the Law of  England (CUP 1885) 2, 74–121 (particularly
106–12 in relation to Bracton on criminal law). Scrutton notes that there are two distinct periods in which
Roman Law influenced English Law, separated by the arrival of  Vacarius in England in 1143 who gave lectures
on Roman Law at Oxford around 1149.
33   The Eyre of  Kent, 6 & 7 Edward II (1313–1314), Selden Society XXIV 109. 
relatively long period. Some early authorities do not mention a specific upper age level at
all while others vary between 12 and 14.34 Kean explains why this may have been the case:
In all probability it was well understood that in his early years a child was too
young to be punished at all, and that later, and until the age of  puberty, special
dolus had to be proven; whether a child was old enough to be convicted or not,
and whether he was of  the age of  puberty or not, were questions of  fact to be
decided by the judge in each case.35
It seems clear that by the seventeenth century the upper age level had become fixed at 14.
Kean is of  the opinion that this is because ‘Coke dogmatized the results of  the Middle
Ages and subsequent lawyers took his word.’36 This was the state of  the common law at
the time that it was received in Australia.
Background Australian law
When Australia began to be colonised in 1788, it was deemed to be terra nullius37 and
therefore it was held to have been settled rather than ceded or conquered. It followed
from this that the common law in existence at the time in England was held to be
applicable in the colony of  New South Wales. Blackstone explained how this process was
understood to operate according to ‘the law of  nature, or at least upon that of  nations’:
For it hath been held, that if  an uninhabited country be discovered and planted
by English subjects, all the English laws then in being, which are the birthright
of  every subject, are immediately in force there. But this must be understood
with very many and very great restrictions. Such colonists carry with them only
so much of  the English law, as is applicable to their own situation and the
condition of  an infant colony.38
As a result, the age of  criminal responsibility as fixed in common law became the law in the
Australian colonies. When the individual colonies became states upon forming the
Commonwealth of  Australia in 1901, they retained criminal jurisdiction which means that the
laws relating to the age of  criminal responsibility are a matter for each state and territory.39
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34   It is interesting to note that the 1619 edition of  Michael Dalton’s Countrey Justice does not specify the upper
age level when there was to no longer be protection from punishment if  the infant lacked knowledge of  good
and evil, but the 1682 edition does specify that this protection did not apply from the age of  14: Michael
Dalton, Countrey Justice (1682) 350. Similarly, the first edition of  William Lambard’s Eirenarhca (1581 at 218)
does not mention an upper age level, but the third edition mentions 12: William Lambard, Eirenarhca (1588)
234–35. 
35   A W G Kean, ‘The History of  the Criminal Liability of  Children’ (1937) 53 Law Quarterly Review 364, 368.
36   Ibid 369.
37   According to Brennan J in the High Court of  Australia in Mabo [No 2] v Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 1 [1992]
HCA 23, under the enlarged notion of  terra nullius, even a land that was inhabited was treated as a ‘desert
uninhabited country’ if  the ‘indigenous inhabitants were not organized in a society that was united
permanently for political action’ [32]. If  this were otherwise, the territory could not be settled, but would have
to have been acquired by conquest or cession and as such local law would continue to apply until modified.
However, Brennan J noted at [37]–[38] that: ‘It is one thing for our contemporary law to accept that the laws
of  England, so far as applicable, became the laws of  New South Wales and of  the other Australian colonies.
It is another thing for our contemporary law to accept that, when the common law of  England became the
common law of  the several colonies, the theory which was advanced to support the introduction of  the
common law of  England accords with our present knowledge and appreciation of  the facts . . . The facts as
we know them today do not fit the “absence of  law” or “barbarian” theory underpinning the colonial
reception of  the common law of  England. That being so, there is no warrant for applying in these times rules
of  the English common law which were the product of  that theory.’
38   William Blackstone, Commentaries of  the Laws of  England Book I (Clarendon Press 1765) ch 4, 106–08.
39   The Australian Constitution (Commonwealth of  Australia Constitution Act) details in s 51 the legislative
powers of  the Commonwealth legislature. 
The twentieth-century started with a common minimum age of  criminal responsibility
of  7 across Australia and ended the century with a common age level of  10, but
throughout the century there were considerable variations in the minimum age level.
Some jurisdictions more clearly followed England and Wales by increasing the age level
from 7 to 8 towards the middle of  the century and then in the latter half  of  the century
to 10, while others retained the age of  7 for longer and went straight from 7 to 10. The
initial change in minimum age in England and Wales from 7 to 8 in 193340 was followed
in New South Wales in 1939,41 South Australia in 194142 and Victoria in 1949.43 The
increase to the age of  10 which occurred in England and Wales in 196344 also occurred
considerably later in Australia, mainly in the late 1980s to early 1990s (New South Wales
in 1987,45 Western Australia in 1988,46 Victoria in 198947 and South Australia in 1993).48
There were some outliers to this general trend, with Queensland raising the age much
earlier in 197649 and Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory much later in 2000.50
In contrast, the upper age level of  conditional criminal responsibility, where the
rebuttable presumption of  doli incapax applies, has remained where it was originally set in
common law in the seventeenth century in all Australian jurisdictions, aside from
Queensland.51 This contrasts, to England and Wales, where the Crime and Disorder Act
1998 abolished the presumption of  doli incapax.52 It may seem surprising that this change
to abolish the presumption of  doli incapax was not followed anywhere in Australia given
that Australian jurisdictions have tended to follow, albeit generally with a delay, reforms
relating to the age of  criminal responsibility in England and Wales. The following will
explain the current law in relation to the age of  criminal responsibility across Australia
before showing that, while there might have been appetite for a reduction in the
protections provided by the rebuttable presumption of  doli incapax in the late 1990s and
early 2000s in some Australian jurisdictions, more recent debates have centred on raising
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40   Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 50. 
41   Child Welfare Act 1939 (NSW), s 126.
42   Juvenile Courts Act 1941 (SA), s 23.
43   Crimes Act 1949 (Vic), s 9. 
44   Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 50 as amended by Children and Young Persons Act 1963, s 16(1).
There was a provision in the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, s 4, which would have raised the age at
which a child could be prosecuted to 14 for all offences other than homicide. However, this provision was
never implemented and was later repealed. 
45   Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987, s 5.
46   Criminal Code (WA), s 29, first para, as amended by the Acts Amendment (Children’s Court) Act 1988, s 44. 
47   Children and Young Persons Act 1989, s 127. 
48   Young Offenders Act 1993, s 5.
49   Criminal Code Amendment Act 1976 (Qld), s 19.
50   Criminal Code (Tas), s 18(1), as amended by Youth Justice (Consequential Amendments) Act 1999 (Tas), s 3;
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), s 25, amending the Children and Young People Act 1999 (ACT), s. 71(1)
(repealed).
51   Aside from Queensland where there was an increase to 15 in 1976, Criminal Code Amendment Act 1976, s
19. This was reduced to 14 in 1997, Criminal law Amendment Act 1997, s 12. 
52   With the result that in England and Wales a child goes from being absolutely criminally incapable to being
fully criminally responsible on their 10th birthday. For discussion of  whether the Act merely abolished the
presumption of  doli incapax but left in place a common law defence of  doli incapax, see Nigel Walker, ‘The End
of  an Old Song’ (1999) 149 New Law Journal 64; DPP v P [2007] EWHC 946 (Admin); R v T [2008] EWCA
Crim 815; Natalie Wortley, ‘Hello Doli . . . Or is it Goodbye?’ [2007] Journal of  Mental Health Law 234;
Thomas Crofts, ‘Taking the Age of  Criminal Responsibility Seriously in England’ (2009) 17 European Journal
of  Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 267–91.
the minimum age level. Raising the minimum age level could, however, pose a threat to
the rebuttable presumption of  doli incapax and reduce protection available for children.
Current approach to the age of criminal responsibility
Despite the fact that the age of  criminal responsibility is a matter for each state and
territory in Australia to determine, since 2000 there has been uniformity in setting the
minimum age of  criminal responsibility at 10 and the conditional age of  criminal
responsibility at 14. For children in this conditional age period (aged 10 but not yet 14),
either the common law presumption of  doli incapax applies or legislative equivalents. The
presumption of  doli incapax and the equivalent legislative provisions operate in much the
same way as they did in England and Wales. For instance, the Criminal Codes of
Queensland and Western Australia provide that:
A person under the age of  14 years is not criminally responsible for an act or
omission, unless it is proved that at the time of  doing the act or making the
omission he had capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the
omission.53
In order for this presumption to be rebutted, or for the legislative equivalent to be
satisfied, the prosecution must bring proof54 alongside all other elements of  the offence,
including any necessary mental element, that the child understood that what they were
doing was seriously wrong as opposed to merely naughty.55 This means that the
presumption must be rebutted beyond reasonable doubt.56 In R v ALH, Cummins AJA
took the view that the prosecution should prove that a child understood that the act was
seriously wrong as part of  the mental element of  the offence.57 This is not, however, the
traditional (and preferable) interpretation, which requires that there is proof  of  such
understanding separate from proof  of  any necessary mental element.58 Being able to
understand that an act is seriously wrong is distinct from forming a mental element in
relation to the physical element(s) of  the offence. As noted by Williams, it is possible to
do an act with intention without knowing it is wrong.59
While in England and Wales there was a degree of  discussion about what sort of
understanding this required, i.e. whether this required an understanding of  the moral or
legal wrongfulness of  the act,60 Australian courts have consistently interpreted the
essential understanding in line with that required in cases of  insanity.61 It is not necessary
to prove that the child understood that the act or omission was against the law, but it must
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Responsibility in Law’ (2013) 13 Youth Justice, 145–60.
61   R v M (1977) 16 SASR 589.
be shown that the child understood that it was wrong according to the ordinary standards
of  reasonable people.62 Understanding that the act was disapproved of  by adults would
not be sufficient because ‘[a]dults frequently disapprove of  breaches of  decorum and
good manners on the part of  children . . . without regarding the acts or omissions in
question as wrong in the relevant sense’.63
Many of  the principles in Australia regarding what evidence is thought sufficient and
appropriate to rebut the presumption of  doli incapax find their basis in cases from England
and Wales. Alongside the basic proposition that the presumption must be rebutted to the
criminal standard, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt, is the rule that the required
understanding ‘must be proved by express evidence, and cannot in any case be presumed
from the mere commission of  the act’.64 The correctness of  this approach was
questioned in Australia in R v ALH where Callaway JA took the view that authorities
suggesting this approach ‘are wrong in principle and should not be followed’.65 Similarly,
Cummins AJA in the same case felt that, provided adult judgements are not attributed to
children, ‘there is no reason in logic or experience why the proof  of  the act charged is
not capable of  proving requisite knowledge’.66 This is because some acts are so ‘serious,
harmful or wrong’ that they establish the required understanding, while others are less
obvious and so may be equivocal or insufficient to establish the understanding.67 The
views of  Callaway JA and Cummings AJA do not, however, seem to have been widely
accepted. In R v JA, Higgins CJ noted the arguments raised by Callaway JA and Cummins
AJA in R v ALH and commented that this ‘decision should not, however, be taken to
establish that proof  of  the voluntary and intentional commission of  the acts charged will
constitute prima facie evidence of  doli capax’.68 The reason for not allowing acts themselves
to be used as evidence alone is to prevent assumptions about what every child would have
known about the wrongfulness of  the act from being used to rebut the presumption and
ensure that there is investigation of  the individual child’s capacity. While evidence of  the
acts constituting the offence should not alone be sufficient to rebut the presumption,
evidence of  factors surrounding the offence (e.g. the degree of  planning, whether the
child tried to hide the crime, whether there was pressure to commit the crime etc.)69 may
be relevant. A major form of  evidence comes from what the child says to police or
others.70 Other factors that may be adduced to rebut the presumption include expert
testimony from a psychologist or psychiatrist,71 evidence of  family background,72
educational level,73 social environment and previous convictions for similar offences.74
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The overall aim should be to gather evidence from as many sources as possible to gain an
overall picture of  the child’s capacities.75
Recent debate
In Australia the minimum age of  criminal responsibility and the presumption of  doli
incapax have been subject to a degree of  criticism. In recent years there have been calls
for an increase in the minimum age of  criminal responsibility and there has been criticism
of  the conditional age period and presumption of  doli incapax for being both over-
protective and under-protective of  young people.
MINIMUM AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
In 1997 the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Equal Opportunity
Commission (EOC) published the report Seen and Heard which called on all Australian
jurisdictions to agree on a uniform age of  criminal responsibility. It was felt wrong that a
child could be liable to be charged in one state but not another for the same behaviour
only because of  his or her age.76 The ALRC and EOC came to the conclusion that the
obvious choice for the minimum age was 10 because most Australian jurisdictions had
already set the minimum at that level and this was consistent with the age in other
common law countries.77 This recommendation was followed, as noted earlier, by the two
jurisdictions with lower age levels (Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory) in 2000.
Despite the fact that most Australian jurisdictions had set the age at 10, as had
England and Wales, it is still perhaps somewhat surprising that the ALRC and EOC did
not recommend a higher minimum age of  criminal responsibility given that the report
also notes that the UN Committee on the Rights of  the Child (UN Committee) had
expressed concern over the low age level in the UK and had asked Australia if  it had plans
to raise the minimum age level.78 Indeed, when the UN Committee heard that Australia
was ‘planning to harmonize the age of  criminal liability and raise it in all the states to 10’,
it commented that it believed that this age level was still too low.79 This is a position that
the UN Committee has maintained (not just in relation to Australia)80 and it has
repeatedly recommended that Australia ‘[c]onsider raising the minimum age of  criminal
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responsibility to an internationally acceptable level’.81 The UNCRC does not specify any
age in calling on nations to establish a minimum age ‘below which children shall be
presumed not to have the capacity to infringe penal law’.82 Neither do the UN Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of  Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules), although
these rules do state that ‘the beginning of  that age shall not be fixed at too low an age
level, bearing in mind the facts of  emotional, mental, and intellectual maturity’.83 The
Commentary on this rule also notes that ‘[i]n general, there is a close relationship between
the notion of  responsibility for delinquent or criminal behaviour and other social rights
and responsibilities (such as marital status, civil majority, etc.)’.
By 2007 the UN Committee felt that some guidance on the minimum internationally
acceptable age level was necessary given that there were such wide variations among state
parties with some having very low age levels of  7 or 8 and others having ‘the
commendable high level of  14 or 16’.84 The UN Committee concluded that 12 is the
minimum internationally acceptable age level, but in doing so it emphasised that states
should see this as the absolute minimum and work towards a higher age level of  14 or
16.85 It took the view that such an age level was preferable because it ‘contributes to a
juvenile justice system which, in accordance with article 40(3)(b) of  CRC, deals with
children in conflict with the law without resorting to judicial proceedings’.86 It is also in
line with the Beijing Rules, which note that there should be a correlation between the age
of  criminal responsibility and the age at which a child is deemed to have other civic rights
and responsibilities.
Since that time arguments have been advanced for an increase in the minimum age of
criminal responsibility to 12 throughout Australia. The latest example is a report entitled
A Brighter Tomorrow: Keeping Indigenous Kids in the Community and Out of  Detention in Australia
released in 2015 by Amnesty International which recommends that the Commonwealth
government take action to fulfil Australia’s international obligations under the UNCRC
and to address the crisis of  over-representation of  Indigenous children in detention. The
report finds that Indigenous children are 26 times more likely to be in detention than
non-Indigenous youth.87 While the overall rate of  children in detention in Australia is
relatively low (975 young people aged between 10 and 17 were in detention on an average
day in 2012–2013),88 the rate of  over-representation is particularly bleak for younger
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Indigenous children. The youngest cohort makes up ‘more than 60 percent of  all 10-year-
olds and 11-year-olds in detention in Australia in 2012–13’.89 One measure which the
report recommends in order to address over-representation is that the Commonwealth
government legislates to increase the minimum age of  criminal responsibility across
Australia to 12.90
CONDITIONAL AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PRESUMPTION OF DOLI INCAPAX
Despite the fact that the presumption of  doli incapax has been subject to a degree of
criticism, particularly in recent times,91 it has remained relatively stable throughout history.
Debate around the continued need for the conditional age period and presumption of  doli
incapax has tended to peak in the wake of  concern over specific cases of  children
committing particularly serious crimes and/or around election times with governments
promising to crack down on youth crime. It is well documented, for instance, that the
abolition of  the presumption of  doli incapax in England and Wales indirectly followed the
public alarm over the Bulger case.92 Similarly, in New South Wales there was discussion over
the future of  the presumption of  doli incapax following the prosecution of  an 11-year-old93
for manslaughter when he pushed a 6-year-old child, Corey Davis, into a river which led to
his death in 1999. This led to the Criminal Law Review Division of  the New South Wales
Department of  Attorney-General publishing a discussion paper containing options for
reforming the presumption of  doli incapax.94 In the same year a Bill was laid before the
Parliament of  Queensland which proposed to reverse the presumption of  doli incapax, such
that the prosecution would not need to rebut the presumption, but the child could raise
incapacity as a defence.95 A few years later, a Bill in Western Australia sought to amend
s 29 of  the Criminal Code of  Western Australia to include a requirement that all first-time
offenders undertake counselling on what constitutes an unlawful act or omission and what
the potential consequences of  engaging in such behaviour are. This then fed into the
second proposed amendment which provided that ‘a person under the age of  14 years who
is a repeat offender at the time of  doing the act or making the omission, has the capacity
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to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission’.96 Calls for reform have
also come from members of  the judiciary, for instance, Lerve DCJ called for either the
presumption of  doli incapax to be abrogated, the age level reduced to 12 or a legislative
change to allow a previous finding of  guilt to be sufficient to rebut the presumption
without any further evidentiary requirement.97
Such proposals for reform of  the presumption of  doli incapax have often been based
around common-sense claims, unsupported by any research, that children now develop
more quickly than in previous times. For instance, during debate on the law in
Queensland, it was said that:
I believe it would be a difficult task to find a child aged 10 to 14 years who does
not know the difference between right and wrong according to what the
community would find reasonable, especially in a time when it is clear that the
incidences of  children, sometimes younger than 10, being involved in serious
crime are definitely on the increase.98
Similarly, in support of  the proposed amendment in Western Australia it was argued that
‘the majority of  children in this age bracket have a reasonable understanding of  what is
right and what is wrong’.99
Another common argument is that the presumption must be abolished because it is
over-protective of  young people and hinders their prosecution. For instance, in the lead-
up to the 2007 elections in New South Wales, the then leader of  the New South Wales
opposition promised to reduce the (conditional) age of  criminal responsibility if  the
Liberal Party were elected because, in his view, the current age of  14 is ‘a severe
impediment to policing and responding to criminal behaviour by very young children’.100
This argument typifies the belief  that young children should be drawn into the criminal
justice system and made responsible for criminal behaviour. It goes hand in hand with the
claim that children do not need the protection that the presumption of  doli incapax
provides because the criminal justice system is no longer as punitive as in former times.101
In contrast to arguments that the presumption is overly protective of  young people is
the argument that it is insufficiently protective. For instance, the ALRC and EOC noted
that the presumption of  doli incapax is problematic because:
. . . it is often difficult to determine whether a child knew that the relevant act
was wrong unless he or she states this during police interview or in court.
Therefore, to rebut the presumption, the prosecution has sometimes been
permitted to lead highly prejudicial evidence that would ordinarily be
inadmissible. In these circumstances, the principle may not protect children but
be to their disadvantage.102
Despite these problems, the ALRC and EOC recommended that the presumption should
be retained and placed on a statutory footing in all Australian jurisdictions.103 There is a
real concern that the presumption does not provide a great deal of  protection and is
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relatively easily rebutted.104 In 2000, during debate on the Criminal Code Amendment Bill
1999 (Qld), it was noted in the Queensland Parliament that ‘[t]here is not a shred of
evidence before this Parliament that this is causing a difficulty in the prosecution of  child
offenders’.105 Those in practice also pointed out that ‘[t]here are no statistics on the
number of  times doli incapax is argued in New South Wales Courts, successfully or
otherwise’.106 Even more concerning is the comment that in Victoria, in rural and
regional areas, many practitioners are not even familiar with the principle.107 Rather than
form an argument for abolition of  the presumption, these concerns should build a strong
argument for taking the presumption seriously and clarifying what the presumption
requires and what sort of  evidence is appropriate and sufficient to rebut it.
The UN Committee has also been critical of  conditional age periods where the
presumption of  doli incapax applies. It considers that this is confusing and could lead to
children being treated differently based on the evidence led to rebut the presumption,
which might not necessarily require evidence from an expert such as a psychologist.108 In
its view, this rule means that often in practice only the minimum age is applied,
particularly for serious offences. The UN Committee therefore prefers a single minimum
age level of  criminal responsibility set at 12 at least, but preferably higher. It is this
approach, rather than arguments that the presumption is over-protective, which
represents perhaps the biggest threat to the presumption of  doli incapax and which could
lead to an overall reduction in the protection available to young people. While there are
problems with the presumption of  doli incapax, there are good reasons to retain it.
The first main argument in favour of  retaining the presumption of  doli incapax is a
practical one. Although the UN Committee has emphasised that it sees 12 as the
minimum acceptable age level, those common law jurisdictions that have raised the
minimum age of  criminal responsibility have tended to see 12 as the appropriate age level
and have abolished the higher conditional age level where the presumption of  doli incapax
applied (e.g. Canada, Ireland and Uganda). While this step enhances protection for 10-
and 11-year-olds in making their protection absolute109 rather than dependent on an
assessment of  their individual capacities, it removes the potential protection for children
aged 12 and 13.
It may well be thought that no child under 12 should ever be dealt with in criminal
proceedings regardless of  their individual capacity, but that does not mean that all
children will be developed enough to have sufficient capacity to be held criminally
responsible as soon as they reach the age of  12. Recent research does show that younger
children might generally be able to make moral judgements about right and wrong in an
abstract context. For instance, an Australian study suggests that children, even from the
age of  8, are as capable as 12-year-olds, 16-year-olds and adults ‘of  appreciating the
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wrongfulness of  criminal conduct and differentially evaluating it from mischievous
conduct’.110 However, earlier research has found that, even though children may have the
capacity to make moral judgements about right and wrong in an abstract context, those
who were most at risk of  committing offences often lacked the capacity to use this
knowledge to regulate their behaviour.111 This study by Newton and Bussey found that:
. . . even though children and adolescents may possess this knowledge [of  right
and wrong] at younger ages they can be hindered from making intelligent
decisions through the influence of  psychosocial factors involved in criminal
decision making. That is, developmental differences on psychosocial factors such
as self-efficacy beliefs can influence children to make poor judgments in relation
to delinquent behavior and undermine their knowledge of  right and wrong.112
Research is also increasingly showing that young people ‘are less psychosocially mature
than adults in ways that affect their decision-making in antisocial situations’.113
Adolescence is a period of  neuro-developmental immaturity where the young are prone
to impulsive, sensation-seeking behaviour with an under-developed capacity to gauge the
consequence of  actions.114 As a report by the Sentencing Advisory Council on sentencing
of  young people in Victoria notes:
The frontal lobe, which governs reasoning, planning and organisation, is the last
part of  the brain to develop. This is likely to contribute to adolescents’ lack of
impulse control, although their attraction to risk and the high value they place on
the immediate rewards flowing from risky behaviour, as well as their heavy
‘discounting’ of  the future costs of  this behaviour, also contribute. Adolescents
are very vulnerable to peer pressure (which in turn can strongly affect their risk-
taking behaviour), in part due to the importance they place on peers and in part
due to neurological and hormonal changes. Scott and Steinberg conclude that
although adolescents have roughly the same ability as adults to employ logical
reasoning in making decisions by early to mid adolescence, adolescents have far
less experience using these skills.115
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This development does not take place at a steady or a constant rate116 and it is difficult
to make generalisations about the abilities of  the young and to set fixed age limits. This
highlights a second and more fundamental justification for the presumption of  doli
incapax: that it is in line with the concept of  criminal responsibility and the reality of
young people’s development. It is therefore ‘a practical way of  acknowledging young
people’s developing capacities. It allows for a gradual transition to full criminal
responsibility.’117 Thus, while the system for addressing criminal behaviour by children is
rooted within a criminal justice system, there is a need for some mechanism to prevent
young people from being drawn into that system if  they are not developed enough to
have the capacities required to be held criminally responsible.
The presumption of  doli incapax serves an important function in ensuring that children
are only prosecuted when absolutely necessary. It should, if  taken seriously, prevent the
police and the courts simply relying on assumptions about what average children might
know and understand and ensure that there is a thorough assessment of  whether
prosecution really is the best way of  dealing with the child. This is in line with the basic
principle enshrined in the UNCRC for ‘[w]henever appropriate and desirable, measures
for dealing with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings’.118 Those who
argue that the presumption should be abolished or weakened so that children can be
brought within the reaches of  the criminal law tend to minimise or even overlook the
dangers associated with punishing children at a young age. In strongly arguing against
Australia taking the path of  England and abolishing the presumption of  doli incapax,
Cummins AJA comments that some of  the criticisms of  the rule ‘are infected by the
therapeutic theory of  criminal justice whereby the coercive dealing with children as
criminals is held a priori to be a benefit to them’.119
Conclusion
The age of  criminal responsibility is a fundamental legal gatekeeper120 to the criminal
justice system. In jurisdictions which deal with children who commit crimes within
criminal justice proceedings, this age should reflect the age at which it is thought that a
child is developed enough to be held criminally responsible. Australia, like many other
countries profoundly influenced by the common law of  England and Wales, has followed
the traditional approach of  setting two age levels of  criminal responsibility. Like England
and Wales, the minimum age of  criminal responsibility, under which a child can never be
subjected to criminal proceedings, was raised from the traditional level of  7 to its current
level of  10 over the course of  the late twentieth century. While the conditional age period
from 10 to 14 and the rebuttable presumption of  doli incapax has been subject to criticism,
intensifying in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century in England and Wales and
throughout Australia, unlike in England and Wales, where it was abolished by the Crime
and Disorder Act 1998, it has resisted any change in Australia.
Internationally, there is now pressure to raise the minimum age of  criminal
responsibility to at least 12. This is the age level that the UN Committee finds to be the
minimum internationally acceptable age and it is the age level that has been adopted by
several common law countries. On either of  the understandings of  the age of  criminal
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116  See, for instance, Cauffman and Steinberg (n 113).
117  Australian Law Reform Commission and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (n 76) [18.20].
118  Article 40(3)(b), UNCRC.
119  R v ALH [2003] VSCA 129.
120  Of  course, there are other gatekeepers, such as police and prosecutors exercising discretion whether or not to
pursue prosecution.
responsibility discussed earlier in this article, it is clear that the minimum age of  criminal
responsibility should be raised to at least 12, but preferably 14 or 16. It is well known that
early involvement in the criminal justice system can have severely negative impacts on a
child and this is not the best place for dealing with offending behaviour. Recent research
also confirms that children into adolescence and beyond may lack the capacities required
to be criminally responsible. Furthermore, in a country which has an alarming rate of
over-representation of  young Indigenous Australians in detention, which shows no sign
of  abating, there is a clear imperative to raise the minimum age of  criminal responsibility
to keep young Indigenous children out of  the criminal justice system.
These calls for an increase in the minimum age of  criminal responsibility and
dissatisfaction with how the presumption of  doli incapax operates (both because it is over-
protective and under-protective) of  children can undermine the protection available to
children. Unlike the abolition of  the presumption of  doli incapax in England and Wales,
other common law countries have tended to appear more benevolent by abolishing the
presumption of  doli incapax in combination with an increase in the minimum age of
criminal responsibility. However, while securing the protection of  10- and 11-year-olds,
such reform removes the conditional protection for 12- and 13-year-olds. The UN
Committee has stated that it would prefer nations to set the minimum age of  criminal
responsibility at 14 or 16 – an age level which would keep children out of  the criminal
justice system and bring the minimum age of  criminal responsibility into line with the age
at which other rights and responsibilities arise. Unless and until governments are willing
to increase the minimum age of  criminal responsibility to such a level, there is a continued
need for the conditional age period with a rebuttable presumption of  doli incapax.
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